In this paper we present new empirical evidence on the agency based asset pricing model of Brennan (1993) . We find strong evidence that in the recent period stocks whose returns covary more with the idiosyncratic component of the S&P500 return have significantly lower returns, holding constant either the market beta or the loadings on the Fama-French factors. The effect is confined mainly to large capitalization stocks, which is consistent with previous evidence that these stocks are favored by institutional investment managers. The lack of evidence for an agency effect in earlier years is also consistent with the much smaller importance of institutional investors in the earlier period and to the late development of risk-adjusted approaches to measuring portfolio management performance.
Introduction
'Financial institutions matter for asset pricing ' Allen (2001) With the exception of Ross' APT, classical theories of asset pricing are based on the assumption that the market is populated entirely by rational expected utility maximizing individuals. This assumption was not unreasonable in the mid-1960's when the CAPM was formulated, since around 85% of US equities were then held by domestic households. However the assumption has become increasingly hard to maintain in subsequent years since, as shown in Figure 1 , the share of US common stocks held by households has now dropped to only about 35%. The share held by domestic institutions is currently 48.8%, while the share held by foreigners is 16%. If we combine the foreign holdings, which are mainly institutional, with the holdings of domestic institutions, then the share of US equities held by institutions is of the order of 65%. Institutional investor demands differ from those of individual investors because of the agency problem that arises from delegated portfolio management: while direct investors are typically concerned only with the return characteristics of their portfolios, investment managers, like corporate managers, have other concerns. Therefore it seems likely that the institutionalization of the equity markets will have a significant effect on the pricing of securities, calling for a model of equilibrium that takes account of agency effect.
In this paper we are concerned with the effects on stock prices of the agency problems of institutional investment managers whose performance is evaluated relative to a stock market index or benchmark. For such managers, the benchmark plays the role of the riskless asset in conventional portfolio theory and, as a result, in equilibrium the expected returns on securities which covary with the benchmark returns are depressed relative to the predictions of a classical asset pricing model.
The use of a benchmark return to evaluate investment performance can be justified at several levels. First, normative considerations point to the use of benchmarks. The theoretical analysis of Holmstrom (1979) suggests that, since the return on a managed portfolio depends on both the random state of nature and the action of the manager, it will in general be optimal for the portfolio manager's reward to depend, not only on the portfolio return, but also on any signal that is informative about the manager's action. One such signal is the return on an unmanaged portfolio such as a market index, and Carpenter et al. (2006) provide conditions under which it is optimal to reward the manager with a bonus which is proportional to the difference between the returns on the managed portfolio and the returns on the benchmark portfolio. On the other hand, Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) question whether benchmark-adjusted compensation schemes are useful. More pragmatically, Cornell and Roll (2005, p61) argue that it makes sense to use a benchmark because 'the client's alternative to hiring an active manager is to use a passive manager who matches a widely followed benchmark'. Empirical evidence also points to the importance of benchmarks in the portfolio management process for agents. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that the probability that a mutual fund manager leaves his or her position is strongly dependent on the realized Jensen's alpha, which is closely related to the excess return relative to the market index. Finally, flows into mutual funds depend strongly on relative performance, 1 which will be well approximated by the excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio that may represent the market return or the return on a segment of the market such as growth or value stocks.
Since security prices are determined by the supply and demand for securities, we should expect the concerns that affect the demands of institutional as well as of individual investors to be reflected in prices, unless institutions are sufficiently transparent that the principals or individual investors on whose behalf the portfolios are managed are able to offset the distortions in institutional portfolios that arise from agency considerations, or the resulting price effects are arbitraged away. It seems unlikely that individual investors have the knowledge or the expertise to make transactions to offset those of the managers, since a primary reason for committing their funds to managers in the first place is a lack of investment expertise. Therefore the 'limits to arbitrage' arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the concerns of institutional investors are likely to leave at least residual traces in the data. 2 The theoretical framework in this paper is taken directly from Brennan (1993) . That paper reported only equivocal empirical evidence of agency related return anomalies. Gomez and Zapatero (2003) present more supportive findings. This is partly because they use a later sample period, and partly because they restrict their analysis to the '220 US securities that have been in the S&P500 without interruption...': as we shall see below, evidence for the agency effect in concentrated in large capitalization stocks. The main 1 See Sirri and Tufano (1998) 2 For the alternative view see Falkenstein (1996). contribution of this paper is to present much more compelling evidence than Gomez and Zapatero (op. cit.), using a much larger sample of securities, and to demonstrate that the agency effect is mediated by a size effect. Institutional portfolios are heavily weighted towards large capitalization stocks - Gompers and Metrick (2001) report that the correlation between proportional institutional ownership and the log of firm size is 0.625. Therefore, we should expect the agency effect, if it exists, to be primarily a larger stock phenomenon, and that is precisely what we find. Moreover, the effect is most significant over the last 30 years when institutional investing has assumed greater importance and performance measurement has become more sophisticated following Jensen's pathbreaking 1968 article on performance measurement. The importance of firm size for the agency effect explains why Brennan (1993) who used equally weighted portfolios was unable to detect it, and why Gomez and Zapatero who restricted their analysis to S&P500 stocks did find evidence for it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. In Section 3 we present a slightly extended version of the agency model. In Section 4 we describe the data and in Section 5 we present our main empirical results. Section 6 presents some robustness results and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
There is strong evidence of clientele effects in stock ownership that reflect the particular concerns of institutional investors. Thus Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that institutional investors invest in stocks that are larger and more liquid than the average stock; institutional ownership is also associated with turnover, age, and S&P500 membership, which is consistent with institutional managers being concerned with both liquidity and 'prudence '. Falkenstein (1996) finds that mutual fund portfolios are tilted toward large liquid firms about which there is a lot of information. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that it is important for investment managers to avoid return outcomes that would reveal them as uninformed or lacking in judgement; this consideration leads to the herd behavior in investment decisions that has been documented empirically by Grinblatt et al. (1995) .
There is also evidence that the decisions of institutional investment managers are affected by agency considerations. Thus Brown et al. (1996) argue that, since asset flows follow returns, the mutual fund market has the characteristics of a tournament. This creates incentives for mutual fund managers to change the risk characteristics of their portfolio during the year in response to their relative return ranking, and they find evidence of such behavior. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) provide more detailed evidence on risk taking and the incentives created for mutual fund managers by the funds flow-performance relationship. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) analyze the incentives of mutual fund managers in terms of their career concerns, and find that younger managers are both more likely to be fired for poor performance and (as a result) take on less unsystematic risk than do older managers. They also report that the subsequent careers of managers who leave a fund is strongly associated with the 'Jensens's alpha'.
There is indirect evidence that asset prices are affected by institutional portfolio preferences. First, liquidity, which Gompers and Metrick (op. cit.) argue is of particular concern to institutions, appears to be a priced characteristic. 3 Further support for the influence of institutional investors as price setters is found in the empirical studies documenting the price effects of inclusion in the S&P500. 4 While the positive returns returns associated with entry into the index suggest lower future returns for firms included in the index, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) find that stocks included in the index have higher returns after adjusting for beta, size, and other characteristics over the period 1977-91; they attribute this to the increased demand for index stocks associated with the growth in index investing which grew from 2% of the equity investment of the top 200 US pension plans in 1980 to around 20% by the end of the sample period. Wermers (1999) and Nofsiger and Sias(1999) have documented price effects associated with institutional herding. More controversially, Gompers and Metrick (op. cit.) attribute much of the 47% cumulative return differential between large and small stocks over the period 1980-96 to the increase in the share of stock held by large-stock preferring institutions. 5 Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a model in which investors allocate assets according to investment 'styles' which designate broad classes of assets. They remark (page 162) that 'money managers are now increasingly evaluated relative to a performance benchmark specific to their style.' While the model in this paper is a static one period asset pricing model in which the benchmarks are pre-determined, Barberis and Shleifer explore the dy-namic implications for asset prices of changing styles or benchmarks when assets are allocated to styles according to the relative past performance of the asset classes corresponding to the different styles.
Our model is closely related to that of Cornell and Roll (2005) who use a related model framework to discuss the theoretical implications of 'delegated-agent asset pricing' but do not present any empirical evidence. In their model, unlike the one we develop, there are only active and passive portfolio managers or agents, but no individual investors.
Asset Pricing with Agency
We consider the simplest single period mean-variance setting with two classes of investor: individuals who invest directly on their own account and are mean-variance optimizers, and agents who manage equity portfolios on behalf of other investors. The supply of capital from these other investors is not modelled. However the reward to the agents is assumed to be proportional to the difference between the return on the managed portfolio and the return on a benchmark portfolio which is chosen exogenously by the suppliers of capital.
The reward of the agent may be an explicit performance fee, 6 or it may be in the form of a subsequent change in assets under management combined with an asset based fee. The benchmark itself may be either explicit or implicit. As an example of an explicit benchmark, Lakonishok et al. (1992) report that most equity managers promise to beat the S&P500 index by 200 to 400 basis points, and that pension fund sponsors allocate money among managers on the basis of their evaluations of the money managers' ability to beat the index. Similarly, Stutzer (2003) cites the TIAA-CREF Trust company: 'Accounts for clients who have growth objectives with an emphasis on equities wil be benchmarked heaveily toward the appropriate equity index -typically the S&P 500 index.' Implicit benchmarks arise because the performance-asset flow relation also induces a concern with relative performance which can be captured by the excess return relative to the average of all competing funds: thus the average portfolio of all competing funds may be regarded as the benchmark for any given fund. Different investment managers may be measured against different benchmarks. Chan et al. (2002) emphasize the differences in investment styles of different managers and claim that they can be analyzed along size and value-growth dimensions. 7 Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a single risk averse agent for each benchmark portfolio i (i = 1, · · · , I) which we denote by the vector of portfolio proportions x 0i , where j ′ x 0i = 1 and j is a vector of units. The agent is assumed to have exponential utility defined over the excess return on the managed portfolio relative to the benchmark, and asset returns are assumed to be multivariate normal with parameters (µ, Ω), where µ is an (nx1) vector and Ω is an (nxn) matrix . Then agent i, who is assumed to be constrained to hold all of the managed portfolio in equities, 8 and to behave competitively, faces a mean-variance problem of the form:
where a i is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and λ i is a Lagrange multiplier. The vector of optimal portfolio proportions is then:
Imposing the constraint x ′ i j = 1 it is seen that λ i = µ ′ Ω −1 j/j ′ Ω −1 j ≡ µ v , the return on the global minimum variance portfolio.
Individual investors are also assumed to have exponential utility functions, with coefficient of risk aversion b j , and the portfolio problem faced by individual investor j (j = 1, · · · , J) is:
where R F is the risk free interest rate, and the optimal portfolio of risky assets is given by the familiar expression:
7 Russell and BARRA both produce indices that capture size and value effects. Cornell and Roll(2005, p61) remark that 'Many benchmarks are available, including diversified international indexes, technology indexes, bond indexes, and specialized indexes designed for industrial sectors or "sin-free" stocks. ..the most common benchmarks are S&P500, Wilshire 5000, or the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) indexes.'
8 Almazan et al. (2004) document the prevalence of portfolio constraints in investment management contracts in the mutual fund industry.
Consider the implications of expressions (2) and (4) for the locations of the portfolios of individuals and agents in mean-standard deviation space. As usual, the individual investor invests in a portfolio of risky assets which is at the point of tangency of a ray drawn from the risk free rate on the vertical axis to the efficient set. The agent combines a 100% investment in the benchmark with a position in a zero net investment portfolio. This consists of a long position in a portfolio, A, with proportions Ω −1 µ/j ′ Ω −1 µ and a short position in a portfolio, B, with proportions Ω −1 j/j ′ Ω −1 j. Portfolio A is located at the point of tangency of a ray drawn from the zero expected return point on the vertical axis to the efficient set, and portfolio B is the minimum variance portfolio. As Roll (1992) emphasizes, the portfolios A and B which capture the deviation from the benchmark are independent of the characteristics of the benchmark itself. Not surprisingly, if the benchmark is inefficient, the portfolios chosen by the agents are in the interior of the efficient set, and Roll (1992) shows that, for a given benchmark portfolio, the mean variance locus of portfolios chosen by the agent lies to the right of the efficient set by a distance which is equal to the difference between the variance on the benchmark portfolio and the efficient portfolio with the same expected return.
Let W i denote the wealth allocated to agent i for investment in equities, and let W * j denote the total wealth of individual j. Then market clearing implies that i W i x i + j W * j x j = W m x m where W m is the total value of the market portfolio and x m is the vector of market value proportions. Substituting from (2) and (4) in the market clearing condition yields the following expression for the vector of equilibrium expected returns :
where
x 0 is the aggregate benchmark portfolio, which is a weighted average of the individual agent's benchmarks, where the weights are the amounts of wealth controlled by each agent.
Equation (5) expresses the expected return on a security as a linear function of the covariance of the security return with the return on the market portfolio, x m , and with the return on the aggregate benchmark portfolio, x 0 . Note that θ 2 is positive so that the expected return is decreasing in the covariance with the benchmark portfolio. This equilibrium condition may be written in terms of the betas of the security with respect to the aggregate market and the aggregate benchmark portfolio so that the expected return on security k, µ k , is given by :
where β km and β k0 are the usual coefficients from the (simple) regressions of the security return on the returns on the market and benchmark portfolio returns. θ 1 * = θ 1 * σ 2 m and θ 2 * = θ 2 * σ 2 0 where σ m and σ 0 are the volatility of returns on the market and the aggregate benchmark portfolios respectively. If we define the (aggregate) benchmark residual return e as the residual from the regression of the aggregate benchmark return, R 0 , on the market portfolio return, R m :
then the equilibrium condition may be expressed also as:
e /σ 2 0 ≥ 0, and β ke is the coefficient of the aggregate benchmark residual return from either a simple regression of security returns on the residual return or, equivalently, from a multiple regression of security returns on market and aggregate benchmark residual returns.
When the benchmark is the market porfolio so that the benchmark and market return volatilities are the same and the benchmark beta, β 0m is equal to unity, the 'market price of risk', λ 1 , reduces to:
Equation (14) implies that λ 1 will be positive so long as the total wealth managed by agents is less than the value of the market portfolio so that individual investors have a net long position.
The equilibrium condition (5) may also be re-arranged to yield an expression for expected returns in terms of the market beta and the betas with respect to each of the individual benchmark residual returns: 9
Equation (15) provides a new rationalization of multi-factor asset pricing. For example, to the extent that agents's benchmarks reflect such characteristics as value and growth or firm size, 10 covariances with returns on portfolios corresponding to these characteristics will be priced, without them necessarily corresponding to factors in an intertermporal CAPM or APT. Of course the agency model does not provide a complete explanation of these multifactor models since as presented in this paper it leaves the determinants of the benchmarks unspecified. Finally, the portfolio of agent i may be expressed in terms of the exoge-9 Stutzer (2003) derives a similar expression in a setting in which the agents who manage equity portfolios are also able to invest in the riskless asset.
10 Dimson and Nagel (2002) argue that value has been a salient investment strategy characteristic in the US since the 1930's, while firm size emerged only after the classic study of Banz (1981) . Sharpe (1992) appears to have been the first to draw attention to the implications of investment style for performance measurement and therefore to have suggested the use of portfolios other than proxies for the market portfolio as appropriate benchmarks.
nous parameters of the model by substituting for the equilibrium expected returns, µ, from equation (5) in equation (2):
When the agent-specific benchmark, x 0i , is identical to the aggregate benchmark portfolio, x 0 , the expression for the agent's portfolio reduces to:
Equation (17) expresses the agent's equilibrium portfolio as a linear function of the benchmark portfolio, x 0 , the market portfolio, x m , and the minimum variance portfolio,
Data and Portfolio Formation
The basic data that are used in our empirical analysis are the returns and market values of all stocks listed on the CRSP tape during the period December 1925 to December 2006. We take as our proxy for the aggregate market index the returns on the CRSP value weighted index. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the S&P 500 is the most commonly used benchmark for US equities, and therefore we proxy the aggregate benchmark returns by the returns on the S&P500 index which are taken from Global Financial Database. 11 The Fama French factors and the 1-month Treasury Bill rate are taken from the website of Ken French.
We proceed initially by forming 25 portfolios based on estimates of β km and β ke . First the S&P500 residual return, e, is obtained by regressing the index return on the CRSP value weighted index return for the whole sample period.
Then, at the beginning of each year from 1931 to 2006, the monthly returns on each security k that has at least 24 observations over the previous 60 months is regressed on the return on the CRSP value weighted index, and on the S&P500 residual returns to obtain estimates of the market beta, β km , and the benchmark (residual) beta, β ke . Then the securities are assigned, first to quintiles on the basis of the estimated market beta, and then within each market beta quintile to one of five portfolios on the basis of the estimated benchmark beta. This procedure yields 25 portfolios with a spread in both market and benchmark betas. The returns on the portfolios for the next 12 months are then calculated assuming first equal portfolio weights at the beginning of the year and no rebalancing within the year (EW) and, secondly, assuming a value weighted portfolio at the beginning of the year where the weights are based on market capitalizations at the end of the previous year, again without rebalancing within the year (VW). Finally the time series of EW and VW returns on each portfolio p, (p = 1, · · · , 25) are regressed on the aggregate market index and the S&P500 residual returns to obtain final estimates of the betas, β pm , and β pe :
For each month the average size of the firms in a portfolio, Size, is defined as the equal or market value weighted average of the log of the market capitalizations. Table 1 reports summary statistics for returns on the CRSP Value Weighted market index, the proxy for the market portfolio; the S&P500 index, the proxy for the aggregate benchmark portfolio; and the S&P500 residual defined in equation (12). As one might expect, the S&P500 is a fairly good proxy for the wider market index: its beta is close to unity, the expected returns and volatilities of the two portfolio are very close, and the correlation between the two portfolio returns is close to 0.99. However, the volatility of the S&P residual is around 80 basis points per month, and the maximum tracking error is of the order of 4-5% per month. Clearly, our proxy for the market portfolio and the S&P500 are not perfect substitutes for an agent whose benchmark is the S&P500. Table 2 reports the characteristics of the two sets of portfolios. t − ratios are not reported in order to save space. However, the t−ratios for both betas are highly significant in most cases. The correlation between the two betas is -0.44 (-0.35) for the EW (VW) portfolios. However, the benchmark beta is highly correlated with the measure of average firm size of the portfolios: 0.83 (0.90) for the EW (VW) portfolios. The returns on large firms (many of which will be in the S&P500) tend to be more sensitive to the idiosyncratic element of the S&P500 return. The spreads of market betas of the portfolios are from 0.68 to 1.81 (EW) and from 0.63 to 1.66 (VW), and the spreads of the S&P500 residual betas are from -3.11 to -.39 (EW) and from -2.11 to 1.61 (VW). Both the market and S&P 500 residual betas are monotonic in the portfolio rankings in these variables, confirming that our sorting procedure is effective. The Size variables displays much less proportional variation across the portfolios: from 10.36 to 10.85 (EW) and from 12.78 to 15.16 (VW).
Empirical Results
In order to determine whether returns are negatively related to the benchmark beta as predicted by the agency model, we first estimate the empirical counterpart of equation (13) using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. Specifically, for each month t we estimate the cross-section regression:
where theβ ′ s are from the first stage regressions. Because of the high correlation between Size and the benchmark beta,β pe , we also include Size in the regressions. The final estimates of λ 1 , λ 2 are obtained from the time series averages of theλ it , and the standard errors are calculated from the variability of the monthly estimates using a Newey-West correction. The results are reported in Table 3 . Considering first the EW portfolio results, we note that the coefficients of both the market beta and the benchmark beta are generally insignificant, although the coefficient of the market beta is generally positive and is significant for the first quarter of our sample, and the coefficient of the benchmark beta is generally negative. The coefficient of the Size variable is insignificantly negative for the whole sample period and for the all the subperiods except the second last quarter of the sample, 1969-1987 when it is slightly positive. These equal weighted portfolio results provide no evidence in support of the agency-based model, nor of the classical CAPM. We also note that the average Size of the firms in the portfolios does not differ greatly across the portfolios.
In contrast, the VW portfolio results show evidence of a negative return effect associated with the benchmark beta, β pe . The coefficient is negative and significant for the whole sample period, for the second half of the sample, from 1969 to 2006, for the third quarter of the sample from 1969 to 1987 and for the last quarter of the sample from 1988 to 2006. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of the Size variable, and the Size variable itself is not significant. The benchmark beta effect is strongly concentrated in the last half of the sample period -for the first two quarters of the sample period the absolute value of coefficient is 0.04-0.08% per month; for the last two quarters the coefficient estimates are in the range of 0.20-0.37% per month. To gain insight into the economic importance of the estimated benchmark beta effect consider the point estimate for the period 1969-2006 of around 0.28% per month. Multiplying this by the spread between the average benchmark betas of the high and low benchmark beta quintiles we obtain 0.28 x (1.12+2.71) = 1.07% per month or approximately 12.9% per year. This exceeds most estimates of the market risk premium and compares with the spread in rewards for liquidity risk of 7.5% reported by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . This suggests that the economic significance of the agency or benchmark effect might be considerable.
The coefficient of the market beta variable is positive and significant for the whole sample period and, consistent with both previous findings, 12 and with equation (14) and the greater proportion of funds under institutional management in recent years, is much smaller in the second half of the sample period. The coefficient declines from over 1% per month in the first half of the sample period to only 15 basis points per month in the period 1969-2006. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the estimated cumulative reward to β pe , obtained by summing the estimated monthly coefficient on β pe from equation (18), when this is estimated using the EW and VW portfolios. When the EW portfolios are used in the estimation, the cumulative reward fluctuates randomly around zero. However, when the VW portfolios are used the cumulative reward, after wandering around zero until 1975, develops a strong negative trend after that date, which is interrupted for the period from 1983 to 1993. It is possible that the interruption in the trend during this period is caused by the growth in indexing 13 and increasing acceptance of performance measurement during this period, which would have tended to raise the prices of securities with high benchmark betas as their prospective returns adjusted to the new agency equilibrium.
It is well known that the Fama-Macbeth estimator of the asset pricing parameters is identical to that obtained by ordinary least squares regression of average portfolio returns on betas. For comparison, in Table 4 we report estimates based on generalized least squares cross-sectional regression of average returns on estimated betas, along with Lagrange Multiplier and Likelihood Ratio tests of the restrictions imposed by the agency model. For the EW portfolios the coefficients of both the market beta and the S&P500 residual beta are generally insignificant and are similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 3 . Moreover the Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the model restrictions for the second half of the sample period and for the last two quarters separately. 14 For the VW portfolios in contrast, the coefficient on the S&P500 residual beta is negative in every subperiod and is statistically significant in every subperiod except the first two quarters of the sample when taken separately. The model restrictions are not rejected by either test except that the Lagrange Multiplier test rejects in the first half and the first quarter of the sample period. Thus the agency model performs well for the VW portfolios in the second half of the sample period, from 1969 to 2006, but is generally rejected using the VW portfolios.
The contrasting results for the EW and VW portfolios suggest that the benchmark effect is most pronounced for large capitalization firms. In order to explore this further, the portfolios were re-formed after dividing them into three groups according to the firm size at the beginning of the year. At the beginning of each year, securities were classified into 3 size groups. If the market capitalization of a security at the end of the previous year is smaller than the 30% break-point, 15 the security is classified as 'Small'; if its size is below or at the 70% break point and above or at the 30% break point, it is classified as 'Medium'; if it is above the 70% break point, it is classified as 'Large'. For each security we calculate a normalized size, Size * , by taking the difference between the market capitalization of the security at the beginning of the year and the median market capitalization divided by the median market capitalization of NYSE. Within each of the three size groupings, we assign each security to one of 25 portfolios according to their estimated values of β im and β ie . As before, we then compute the EW and VW returns over the next 12 months and, linking these returns across the whole sample period, use them to calculate β pm and β pe . We also calculate each portfolio's average Size and normalized Size * (EW and VW), based on the log of market capitalizations and the normalized size of the securities each month. Finally, for each month we calculate the interaction variables, Size * β pm and Size * β pe using the value of Size * calculated at the end of each month.
The results of estimating the parameters of the agency CAPM for the 14 Stambaugh (1982) reports in a similar context that the Lagrange Multiplier test conforms more closely to its asymptotic distribution in small samples than does the Likelihood Ratio test.
15 The breakpoints, which are described in Fama and French (1993) , are based on the size distribution of NYSE firms. They were downloaded from Ken French's website.
three size groups separately are reported in Table 5 . 16 The results are striking. There is no evidence of a benchmark effect for either the Small or the Medium size groups. However, for the Large size group the benchmark effect is negative and highly significant as predicted by the agency model for the whole sample period and for the second half of the sample period; it also significant for the third quarter, from 1969 to 1987, and for the final quarter the coefficient is also negative and significant at the 1% level. The evidence for the benchmark effect is considerably stronger for the Large size group than it was for the whole sample reported in Table 2 . Figure 3 provides visual confirmation of the role of firm size for the benchmark effect. For Small and Medium firms the cumulative benchmark effect is if anything slightly positive until the late 1990's. However, for the Large firms there is a strong negative trend in the cumulative effect which starts around 1966. Table 6 reports estimates of equation (18) using all 75 size and beta sorted portfolios, and including Size * interaction terms for the intercept and both the market and benchmark betas:
For EW portfolios the coefficient of the (Size * * β pm ) term is significant only for the sub-period 1950-68 and 1988-2006 : during this period systematic risk was more strongly rewarded for large firms. The coefficient of Size * is negative and significant for the period 1950-68. The coefficient of (Size * β pe ) is negative and highly significant for the second half of the sample period and for the two final quarters separately, while it is very close to zero and is insignificant for the first two quarters and the first half of the sample period. For the VW portfolios the coefficient of (Size * * β pm ) is also positive and significant for the whole period and is marginally significant for the two half-periods separately. The evidence of a size mediated benchmark effect is less strong for the value weighted portfolios: nevertheless, the coefficient of (Size * β pe ) is negative for the second half of the sample period and for the final quarter. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level for the 1969-1987 period. Overall, these findings are consistent with our earlier results that show that the benchmark effect is negative and significant only for large firms, and only since about 1970. The results are weaker for the VW portfolios, but again the effect is negative and significant for the period 1969-2006.
The changing reward to β pe for large firms that is apparent in the quarterly coefficients of β pe for Large firms in Table 5 , and of Size * * β pe in Table  6 , is also apparent in the change in the behavior of the cumulative reward to β pe for large firms around 1970 shown in Figure 3 . This is consistent with developments in measuring portfolio management performance that were occurring around that time, as the insights of Markowitz (1952) were absorbed, and the notion of a risk return trade-off began to be understood by authors such as by Sharpe (1966) , Treynor (1966) , and Jensen [1969] . For example Klemkovsky (1973) noted that:
'In recent years risk-adjusted measures of performance have been receiving considerable attention outside of the academic journals. The well publicized Bank Administration Institute study of 1968 concluded that a complete evaluation of a pension fund manager's investment performance must include an assessment of the degree of risk taken to achieve the returns realized. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in its Institutional Investor Study of 1971, has stated that performance measures should be adjusted for volatility and incentive fees should be based only on volatility-adjusted returns.'
By 1973, Wells Fargo Bank, influenced by theoretical developments in capital market theory, started the first index fund based on the S&P500 index and the separation of 'alpha' and 'beta' in investment management was begun.
Robustness Tests
If different agents have different benchmarks, then the expanded agency model of equation (15) expresses expected returns in terms of the market beta and the betas with respect to each of the benchmark residual returns. Lakonishok (2002, p1412) tell us that 'in practice investment managers generally tend to break the domestic equity investment universe down into four classes: large-capitalization or small-capitalization growth stocks and large-capitalization or small-capitalization value stocks, and they present evidence that the Fama-French SMB and HML factors do a good job in summarizing the investment styles of mutual fund managers. Insofar as the benchmark portfolios can be written as linear combinations of the S&P500 and the Fama-French portfolios SMB and HML, the agency model may be written as:
where β * kHM L , β * km and β * kSM B are the coefficients from the multiple regression of returns on three Fama-French factors and, as before, β ke is the S&P500 residual beta. Under the agency model λ 4 < 0 but λ 2 , λ 3 cannot be signed since they are associated with arbitrage portfolios that correspond to a long and a short position in two benchmark portfolios.
Therefore, as a robustness test of the simple agency model, we also test the extended agency model (20). First, the S&P500 residual was estimated by regressing the S&P500 portfolio returns on the returns on the market portfolio, proxied again by the CRSP Value Weighted portfolio. Then, at the beginning of each year from 1931 to 2006, the monthly excess returns on each security k with at least 24 observations over the previous 60 months were regressed on the excess return on the CRSP value weighted portfolio, the HML and SMB returns, and the S&P500 residual returns to obtain estimates of the market beta, β * km , and the benchmark (residual) beta, β ke . Then, as before, the securities were assigned, first to quintiles on the basis of the estimated market beta, and then within each market beta quintile to one of five portfolios on the basis of the estimated benchmark beta. This procedure yielded 25 portfolios with a spread in both market and benchmark betas. Then equal weighted and value weighted portfolio returns were calculated as before.
The value weighted portfolio characteristics are reported in Table 7 . There is relatively little variation in the FF factor loadings, β * SM B and β * HM L , across the 25 portfolios. There is some tendency for firms that have intermediate values of the S&P500 residual beta, β pe , to have higher values of β * HM L . Higher values of β * SM B are associated with higher values of the S&P500 residual beta and higher values of the market beta, β m . Table 8 reports estimates of the extended agency model for both EW and VW portfolios. For the EW portfolios the estimated coefficients of neither β m nor β pe are significant for any sub-period except for the coefficient of β pe for the period 1969-1987 which it is significant and positive, thus providing no support for the agency model. Of the coefficients of the three Fama-French betas, only the coefficient of β SM B is significant: it is strongly positive in the first half of the sample period. In contrast, for the VW portfolios the coefficient of β pe is negative and significant for the whole sample period both with and without the inclusion of the Size variable. It is not significant during the first half of the sample period from 1931 to 1968, but is strongly significant in the second half. Turning to the quarter subperiod estimates, the coefficient is negative but insignificant in the first two quarters. In the period 1969 to 1987 the point estimate of the coefficient is -0.16, which is similar to the estimate from the whole sample period, -0.15, but it is only marginally statistically significant with a t-statistic −1.81. In the final subperiod from 1988 to 2006 the magnitude of the coefficient estimate increases to -0.23 and the estimate is highly significant. The coefficients of the loadings on the Fama-French market and HML factors are insignificant for the whole sample period, are generally insignificant in the subperiod results. The coefficient of the loading on the SMB factor is positive and significant for the whole sample period and for most of thesub-periods. The Size variable is significantly negative for the entire sample period. These results are quite similar to those reported for the simple agency model in Table 3 . Indeed the whole period estimate of the coefficient of β pe is -0.17 for the simple model as compared with -0.15 for the extended model, and the subperiod point estimates are also quite similar. Table 9 , which parallels Table 5 , reports estimates of the extended model using three different samples of firms according to firm size. Again, we find that the coefficient of β pe is significant for the sample of large firms; the point estimate is negative for all sub-periods except 1950-68 when it is essentially zero, and the estimate is statistically significant for the whole period, the second half and the final quarter. The coefficient is not significant for the Medium and Small firm samples for any sample period, though it is generally negative. Table 10 reports the results of inter-acting the Size * variable with the factor loadings and the S&P residual beta. Now, the coefficient of β pe is generally not significant. However, when the variable is interacted with Size * the coefficient is negative and significant for the whole sample period, the second half, and the subperiod 1969-87. It is negative and marginally significant for the final quarter, 1988-2006 . Thus the expanded agency model provides further evidence of the role of firm size in mediating the agency benchmark effect in the second half of the sample period.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple model of asset pricing with agency which, we argue, is likely to be more descriptive of contemporary capital markets than the classical capital asset pricing model, because it takes account of the fact that a substantial proportion of equity portfolios are now managed by financial institutions on an agency basis. The model assumes that the capital market is populated by a mix of individual investors and institutions who manage money on an agency basis. The agents are assumed to be concerned, not with the raw return on their portfolios, but with the return relative to a benchmark portfolio. Assuming normal distributions of returns and exponential preferences for both individuals and agents, we demonstrate that the resulting equilibrium is a multi-beta asset pricing model. The first beta is the classical market beta and the second beta is with respect to the component of the return on the weighted average benchmark portfolio that is orthogonal to the market return. The market price of the market beta risk is positive as in the classical setting, but the market price of benchmark risk is negative. The intuition for the latter result is that since the benchmark plays the role of the riskless asset for agents, they bid up the price of assets which load strongly on the benchmark return.
We test the predictions of the model using returns on common stocks from CRSP for the period 1931-2007, and confirm Franklin Allen's claim that 'financial institutions matter' for asset pricing, though with some qualifications. First, there is no evidence of the agency effect until the second half of our sample period -from around 1968 to 2007. This is not only the period in which the role of institutions in capital market has assumed the greatest importance. It is also the period in which portfolio management performance has come to be evaluated on a risk adjusted basis. Performance relative to a benchmark portfolio which reflects the investment style of the manager is the simplest kind of risk adjustment. For the second half of the sample period we find strong evidence of agency effects in asset pricing using the S&P500 portfolio as a proxy for the aggregate benchmark portfolio. The results are robust to a risk specification that includes only the market portfolio as in the classical CAPM and to the Fama-French 3-factor model which we show can be interpreted as a multi-benchmark version of the agency based asset pricing model we have developed. 
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